

# January 2017 CMSDL Core Files Update Index

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

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
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# **Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage (January 2017 Update)**

# Vocabulary


**Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, ISIL)**—Sunni Muslim extremist group that believes in the spread of Islam across the world. They are a militant and spread their power through violence, kidnapping, and torture.



Source: IHS (1 August 2016)



## Who is who in the Syrian opposition




**Diplomatic Capital:** Power to influence other countries through negotiations, incentives, or bargaining chips. The DA argues that Obama only has so much, so he has to spend it wisely.

**Syria:** A country in the Middle East where has broken out between Assad, ISIS, and opposition groups. There are many different religious and political groups fighting for survival and power in the country. The death tolls are high and it is a serious crisis.

**Bashar Al-Assad:** (Bah-shar all-awss awd): President of Syria fighting for control of the country. He is described as authoritarian kind of like a dictator. He has used violence against those that oppose him.

**Diplomatic Talks:** These are conversations between countries to try to find peace in Syria. These include the US, Russia, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. However, each country has different opinions on how and what should be done.

**South China Seas (SCS):** Part of the Pacific Ocean just southeast of China. It is near Taiwan, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Vietnam. A great deal of goods are moved through the area and there's supposedly a lot of oil in the sea bed. There are serious disputes about who actually owns it and thus many countries are fighting over it.




**Senkaku Islands:** Islands in the East China sea that have no one living on them. The US gave them to Japan, but China disagrees. These islands, like the South China Sea, are areas where fighting might erupt.

**Xi Jinping (She jin-PING):** General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of China, and the Chairman of China's Central Military Commission. He's like Obama, but even more powerful since China does not have the same political structure as the US. Essentially, he's the president of China.

**People's Liberation Army (PLA):** The Chinese armed forces. Basically the accumulation of all the Chinese military. It is the largest military in the world.

## Changing the Guard

China's People's Liberation Army personnel, in millions, since 1949



Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

**AT=Answers To**

## 1NC Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage Shell

### A. UNIQUENESS: President-elect Trump is focusing diplomatic relations on Russia instead of China.

**BEAUCHAMP & ALEEM, DECEMBER 18TH, 2016** [Zach Beauchamp, international writer for Vox and previously edited a section on political thought at ThinkProgress and contributed to The Dish, Zeeshan Aleem, Vox writer covering economics and energy for the foreign affairs team, "Obama cozied up to China and battled Putin. Trump is doing the exact opposite." <http://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/18/13921962/trump-obama-china-russia-policy>]

President Barack **Obama** has **spent his two terms** in office **working to build closer ties with China while seeking to isolate** and punish Vladimir **Putin's Russia**.

Eight years later, **Moscow is subject to painful US sanctions and continued public criticism from Obama** and his aides. Beijing is a key economic partner that has at times served as a conduit to the rogue regime in North Korea.

To a large extent, that's because the two countries have acted fairly differently in recent years. Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, 2015 bombing campaign in Syria, and 2016 hack of the US election convinced the administration that Russia was a threat to the international order — a power unwilling to play by the rules. Despite its aggressive moves in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has been far less confrontational, and far more willing to negotiate with the West in good faith on long-range issues like climate change.

Team Trump sees things totally differently.

**President-elect Donald Trump sees Putin not as a threat to Western norms but as a tough and capable leader and potential partner in fighting radical Islam. China, in his eyes, is a threat to the US economy** — responsible for the loss of massive numbers of American jobs — and a country that US presidents have been far too soft on for decades. By this analysis, Russia is the potential partner, and China the potential enemy worth confronting.

"China is the biggest state adversary in Trump's mind," Patrick Cronin, the senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the left-leaning Center for a New American Security, tells Vox. "It's not Russia. It's China."

The differing worldviews have been on public display in recent days. Obama used his press conference at the White House on Friday to suggest Putin was connected to his country's cyberattacks against the US and belittled Russia. "They are a smaller country, they are a weaker country, their economy doesn't produce anything that people want to buy except for oil and gas and arms, they don't innovate," he said. On China, he recommended respect for diplomatic tradition, cautioning against Trump's indications that he would consider dropping Washington's "One China" policy, the diplomatic understanding on the status of Taiwan that has underpinned US-Chinese relations for decades.

Trump, by contrast, has publicly castigated the CIA for its assertion that Russia ran a sustained hacking campaign designed to boost his chances of winning the presidency. And he's been unrepentant about his tradition-breaking phone call with the president of Taiwan and language on revisiting One China. Beijing has responded by saying that the countries would have "nothing to discuss" on other issues if Trump tries to deviate from One China. And after China agreed to return an unmanned US Navy drone it seized on Friday — an act that led to a striking uptick in maritime tensions between the two countries — Trump tweeted: "We should tell China that we don't want the drone they stole back.- let them keep it!"

What this suggests — though, knowing Trump, we can't be sure — is that **we're about to see a massive about-face in great power politics. Obama's basic policy — work with China, isolate Russia — is about to be flipped on its head. The US is going to start working with Russia on a raft of issues, and start challenging China on a lot more. That could mean US policy reversals on a whole host of issues**, from Syria to climate change to the US economy, with potentially major consequences for people around the world.

## B. LINK: Russia views US-China engagement like the plan as a zero sum tradeoff with productive US-Russian diplomacy

**THE HILL, DECEMBER 7<sup>TH</sup>, 2016** [Prominent political news website, EDWARD GOLDBERG, THE HILL CONTRIBUTOR  
<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/309244-trump-is-playing-a-risky-political-game-with-china>]

If the **Chinese leadership perceive that their legitimacy is threatened by Trump's willingness to break historic protocol** and publicly interact **with Taiwan**, then the possibilities of a rivalry between the United States and China similar to the pre-World War I analogy of the United Kingdom and Germany could become acute.

**Abetting this potential rivalry is Russia, the true declining power with a gross domestic product now about the size of that of Spain. Russia is the major country that is threatened by the global order and threatening to the global order.**

**Russia has nothing to lose by trying to reshuffle the deck.** What makes the Russian situation more complicated is that on account of its political culture and history, the Moscow perceives the world differently. It sees it in 19th century great game terms.

Russia is the major economy that, beyond a collapsing energy market, has no skin in the globalized game. Just look at this in terms of the United States. **Of all the major economic players in the world, the United States has by far the smallest and almost nonexistent trade relationship with Russia.**

In 2015, the United States exported approximately \$116 billion worth of products to China and imported approximately \$482 billion. Although the import numbers from China greatly outweigh the export numbers, they only tell part of the story.

Whether it is Walmart, Apple, Nike, or warehousing Chinese steel in Long Beach, California, there is a vast amount of Americans whose jobs are dependent on China.

In addition, General Motors (GM) and its joint-ventured Chinese factories manufactured and sold more than 3.6 million vehicles in China in 2015, making it GM's largest market. China is Apple's second largest market. Even Hershey Chocolates is now producing in China for the Chinese market.

In terms of U.S. exports to China, the products range from the approximately 12.3 million bales of cotton exported annually primarily from Texas to Mercedes cars manufactured in Indiana for the Chinese market. U.S. exports to Russia last year, however, were only \$7.1 billion, less than one percent of our total exports. Imports in 2015 from Russia were approximately \$16.6 billion. In terms of customers for U.S. products, Russia is about the same size as Thailand.

Russia's need of spheres of influence and buffer states is in direct conflict with globalization. If a country is economically interlinked around the globe, it does not need spheres of influence for protection.

It is very doubtful that interlinked markets will attack interlinked markets. What Russian leadership doesn't understand is that the chess game of realpolitik, of pawns in the name of buffer states protecting the queen, is no longer necessary.

The problem, however, is that the United States can now be easily trapped into playing the Russian game. Holding a very weak economic hand, not wanting to change its system from a kleptocracy to a modern economic nation and believing that the projected power of the state is a substitute for democratic legitimacy, **Russia sees itself caught between America and China.**

In this situation, **Putin's best strategy is to follow the Nixon and Kissinger model, but in reverse. Nixon and Kissinger saw the need to re-establish relations with China; that is, to play the China card as a way to pressure the Soviet Union.**

**Putin, by placating the new Trump administration,** which campaigned on a confrontational relationship with China, **could be in a position to play the American card against his economic giant to the east.** But for America, this is a fool's game.

## C. INTERNAL LINK: Russia is key to negotiating a ceasefire in Syria and to defeat ISIS

**COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2015** [Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow, "Syria: The Need for Diplomacy and De-escalation" Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 55, December 2015]

**The current policy—gradually escalating the war in the hope of forcing a comprehensive political transition—is unlikely to succeed.** As opposed to regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, where unpopular leaders quickly fell to opposition protests, Assad is backed not only by sizeable military forces and a considerable portion of his population but also—and perhaps most importantly—by major outside powers determined to prevent the collapse of his regime. Tehran sees its position in Syria as critical to its regional leverage and has thus supplied the regime with money, weapons, and direct military assistance, particularly through its proxies in Hezbollah. Russia is also determined to keep the regime in place. **Moscow vehemently opposes the principle of regime change and worries that Assad's fall could lead to even greater chaos with no one in charge or extremists taking power.**

This explains why outside support for Assad's opposition, provided by the United States and others, has not accomplished its stated goals. **Rather than forcing the regime to the table—essentially to negotiate its own demise—it has led only to a military stalemate that is benefiting the extreme elements of the opposition, including the Islamic State. The result has been a growing, open-ended conflict, with devastating humanitarian, strategic, and geopolitical consequences.**

Diplomacy and De-escalation

**To end the conflict in Syria, the United States should** pursue a course of action consisting of the following steps:

Institutionalize a diplomatic process with all parties involved. The October 30 and November 14 multilateral meetings in Vienna, for the first time including Iran and Saudi Arabia, were a useful first step. Participants agreed on basic principles, including preserving Syria's unity, independence, and territorial integrity, and on the need for a political process that would ultimately lead to a new constitution and elections. While influential countries remain deeply divided on the question of whether, how, or when to require Assad's departure, only by hammering out issues collectively and realizing the high costs of maximalist positions can the gaps be narrowed. When the Bosnia "Contact Group" was created as the war there raged in the early 1990s, the United States, Europe, and Russia were all far apart on key issues. They ultimately compromised, imposed a solution on recalcitrant local parties, and agreed on a settlement that has kept the peace in Bosnia for two decades.

Initiate a bilateral U.S. back-channel process with Russia. Because no agreement on the most sensitive issues can be reached with nearly twenty participants around a table, **the United States should pursue back-channel discussions with Russia** at the highest levels. **The objective would be a quid pro quo that assures Moscow that the Assad regime will not collapse in exchange for a cease-fire between the regime and the opposition, and joint focus on the Islamic State. If Russia continues to insist on propping up the regime and indiscriminately bombing all elements of the opposition, the United States and others will maintain their support for opposition fighters, the war will go on, and Russia will alienate the Sunni world and become a growing target for terrorists.** The October 31 bombing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai and the November 24 downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey underscore the risks for Russia in the absence of a settlement. But **if Moscow is willing to press for policy changes** from Damascus—**including support for a cease-fire**, recognition of opposition autonomy in parts of the country, and a process for longer-term leadership changes—**a diplomatic agreement might be possible.**

Pursue a cease-fire between the regime and the opposition. The goals of an agreement would include an end to both sides' offensive operations, including regime aerial attacks; devolution of power so that regions currently held by the opposition can govern themselves; the uninhibited provision of humanitarian assistance to both sides; and the adoption of a political process to determine political leaders and structures to govern an ultimately unified Syria. Given the extremely fragmented nature of the opposition, with no single authority in control and even moderate groups now fighting alongside extremists, it will be nearly impossible to prevent some violations of a cease-fire even if an agreement is reached. But **if Russia and Iran were able to guarantee an end to the regime's attacks on the opposition and the provision of humanitarian aid, supporters of the opposition would be well placed to press their clients to accept a cease-fire by threatening to cut off assistance for those who refuse.** The Islamic State would not be party to the cease-fire and would

continue to be targeted. International peacekeepers might be required to police the agreement, but the risks of deploying them would be significantly reduced if all the external powers were committed to the deal.

Defer the question of Assad. There is no doubt that Assad is a brutal dictator who deserves to face justice. The question, however, is whether the pursuit of that elusive goal is worth the costs of an unending war or the consequences of the military escalation that would be necessary to end the war. The United States and others do not have to abandon their position that Assad has lost legitimacy and that Syria will not be fully stable—or accepted by the international community—as long as he is in place. And they could condition support for a cease-fire on a political process that would determine the country's eventual political structure and leadership. But they should not allow disagreement over Assad's fate to be the obstacle to reducing the violence, if other elements of an agreement could be reached. Those countries most determined to see Assad's departure—such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey—will resist such an outcome, but a clear U.S. position and clarity that the United States will not support military escalation could help bring about their acquiescence. Many weary Syrians, and a growing number of countries, even in the Arab world, would welcome an end to the fighting even if it was not accompanied by immediate regime change in Damascus.

Continue the fight against the Islamic State. Even as they pursue a diplomatic agreement to de-escalate the conflict between the opposition and the regime, the United States and its partners should intensify the war on the Islamic State. This should include efforts to empower the Sunnis of Iraq, maintenance of the coalition's bombing campaign, greater intelligence sharing in Europe, the deployment of U.S. and other special forces, and the provision of military assistance to groups willing to target the Islamic State. **If the regime and the opposition forces accepted cease-fires vis-à-vis each other on the basis of the current lines of control, they and their outside backers could focus their efforts on the common enemy—the Islamic State.**

### **A. Impact: ISIS will use nuclear weapons**

**Macdonald, March 2016** [Cheyenne, Writer for DailyMail, cites Harvard Study, March 30, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3516207/Harvard-researcher-warns-ISIS-brink-using-nuclear-weapons.html>]

**The possibility of a nuclear-armed ISIS may not be as far-off as many experts suggest**, a Harvard researcher has warned. In a recent report for Project on Managing the Atom from Harvard's Belfer Center, Matthew Bunn explains how the threat of nuclear terrorism is rising as extremist groups continue to evolve. While there has not been any concrete indication that ISIS is pursuing nuclear materials, the researcher says that the actions and rhetoric of the group suggest its need for such powerful weapons. In recent years, there have been numerous occasions of suspicious events relating to nuclear facilities in Belgium, Defense One points out. While it would be difficult to ISIS or other terror groups to obtain the knowledge of security features and access nuclear materials, Bunn explains that the evidence of such intentions are growing. The report precedes the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, which will take place between March 31 and April 1. According to the authors, the summit will help to determine the feasibility of terrorist groups getting their hands on nuclear materials. The threats come from the possibility of three types of nuclear or radiological terrorism, the authors write: **detonation of an actual nuclear bomb,** **sabotage of a nuclear facility, or use of a 'dirty bomb' to spread radioactive material.** Each of these comes at a different level of risk, and the authors focus for the most part on **the potential danger from the use of an actual nuclear bomb, as these results would be 'most catastrophic.'** Still, the other types of threats do not come without consequences. 'The radiation from a dirty bomb, by contrast, might not kill anyone—at least in the near term—but could impose billions of dollars in economic disruption and cleanup costs,' the authors write. 'The effects of sabotage of a nuclear facility would depend heavily on the specific nature of the attack, but would likely range between the other two types of attack in severity. 'The difficulty of achieving a successful sabotage is also intermediate between the other two.'

## North Korea Specific Link

### **Diplomacy with China over North Korea destroys diplomatic capital**

**Cohen, March 2016** [Michael, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University, "China: Between U.S. Sanctions and North Korea", march 21, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-between-us-sanctions-north-korea-15551>]

The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, lauded China last week for joining Washington in what is probably the toughest response North Korea has faced in twenty years. But such praise may well have been premature. Last week, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said Beijing opposed any unilateral punishments against North Korea. Indeed, some evidence suggests that Pyongyang siphoned off tens of millions of dollars through a Singaporean branch of China's biggest bank to evade the sanctions and conceal payments for arms and luxury goods for the regime. The grim reality is that Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un decided that North Korea must have nuclear weapons, and that China has thus far decided that, as far as Beijing is concerned, the benefits of that program outweigh the costs. China has made many pledges on North Korean sanctions in the past, but has always failed to honor them and to systematically enforce its commitments. On the benefit side of the ledger, a nuclear North Korea increases the cost and improbability of any U.S.-South Korean move against North Korea, and keeps a regime friendly to Beijing on its doorstep. Perhaps just as importantly, **a nuclear North Korea impedes U.S. power projection on the Korean peninsula and saps U.S. diplomatic and political resources that cannot be directed to other areas such as the South China Sea.** Beijing deeply opposes the sanctioning of anybody using North Korean slave labor. China may be keeping the regime afloat through its provision of economic and military resources—better after all to feed North Koreans in North Korea than risk a massive refugee exodus into China if the regime collapses—and can rationally justify this as a good investment on these grounds.

## 2NC/1NR AT #1—Can't Speculate on Trump's Agenda

**They say We don't know what Trump's Foreign Policy plans are yet, but**

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT'S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

**1. Extend our Beauchamp & Aleem- Dec 18th evidence.**

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR'S NAME]

**It's much better than their \_\_\_\_\_ evidence because:**

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR'S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it's newer)                      (the author is more qualified)                      (it has more facts)  
 (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself)                      (history proves it to be true)  
 (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)  
 (                      )                      (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

**The Beauchamps & Aleem evidence says that Trump sees China as a threat and as a result has become friendly with Putin in order to align himself with an ally to help lessen China's dominance in the region.**

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

**2. Trump's recent appointments show his agenda is geared toward diplomacy with Russia**

**FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 15<sup>TH</sup>, 2016** [James Nadeau, European affairs advisor and foreign policy analyst currently based in Brussels, Belgium and has been featured in The Kyiv Post and the Hill, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/12/15/trump-courting-russia-contain-china/>]

On December 13, Donald Trump [nominated](#) ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson for Secretary of State. **Tillerson's nomination raised** questions on whether the top executive of one of the world's largest corporations (5th largest by market cap, to be exact) can put the American national interest above business interests. Questions of incompatibility aside, what weighs even heavier are the **accusations of Tillerson's connections to** Russian President Vladimir **Putin**.

Trump's pick is the most recent of many controversial choices for top jobs in his administration. The **President-elect's inner circle has long been accused of harboring pro-Putin and pro-Russian attitudes reflected in their cabinet picks and associates.**

For example, former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort has been [investigated](#) by the FBI over connections to a high-ranking pro-Russian politician in Ukraine, from whom he allegedly received a \$12.7 million cash payment. **Future Trump national security advisor General Michael Flynn attended a dinner in Moscow in 2015 and was seated at Putin's table**, while long-time Trump supporter Roger Stone admitted to having had "back channel" communication with Wikileaks head Julian Assange.

Stone boasted on Twitter that Hillary campaign chairman John Podesta would have some “time in the barrel,” and Podesta’s emails were [hacked](#) by Russian groups and then posted on Wikileaks. **Trump himself has on multiple occasions showered Putin with praise, a favor that was reciprocated by the Russian President.**

**At the same time Trump is cozying up to Russia, he is taking an increasingly rougher tone with China.** As he has made abundantly clear while on the campaign trail, he considers China a serious—if not the most serious—threat to the United States.

### **3. Trump is pushing for less diplomatic engagement with China and more with Russia. Involvement with China directly trades-off with Russia.**

**KOHLMANN, DECEMBER 29<sup>TH</sup>, 2016** [Thomas Kohlmann, writer for Deutsche Welle newspaper, interviewing Thomas Jäger, Professor of international and foreign politics at the University of Cologne <http://www.dw.com/en/can-trump-contain-china-with-russias-help/a-36935856>]

DW: **By picking hawkish China critic Peter Navarro to lead the newly established White House National Trade Council,** what is Donald Trump trying to achieve?

Thomas Jäger: Navarro's nomination proves that **Trump wants to reshape and redesign policies** rather than adapting to the changing situations. The incoming US administration says it wants to take a new path in foreign policy. The president-elect's team won't be as cautious in its business with China as the Obama administration. Trump believes that the US governments have emboldened Beijing, which now dominates international trade policies. Will Trump start a trade war with China?

What we can say for sure is the US won't remain passive anymore. **The US under Trump will redefine its relationship with Russia and try to contain China with Moscow's help. Trump will also strengthen ties with China's neighboring countries in the Pacific. This would be an enormous economic and political containment of China.**

**Are you saying that rapprochement with Russia and aggression toward China is part of the same US foreign policy?**

**I think so. If Trump succeeds in reshaping US relations with Russia, China will come under pressure.** Then Beijing is likely to negotiate and could give up its claims on the South China Sea or offer trade concessions. We should keep in mind that an aggressive economic policy played a big role in the US' "victory" over the Soviet Union.

Are we in for a complete paradigm shift?

It looks possible. Maybe, it won't come to this. It also depends on how Moscow and Beijing react to Trump's policies. But **it is pretty obvious that Trump and his team are pursuing a policy of being tough with China and easy with Russia** at this point.

## 2NC/1NR AT #2—Trump won't be Distracted

**They say Trump won't be de-railed from solving the Syrian conflict with Russia, but**  
[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT'S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

**1 Extend our Hill '16 evidence.**

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR'S NAME]

**It's much better than their Macleod evidence because:**

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR'S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it's newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)  
(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)  
(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) **(it takes into account their argument)**

( ) **(their evidence supports our argument)**

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

**If the US works with China, Russia will not see US as a strategic partner anymore because of their diplomatic engagement with China. Russia will only work with the US because they see the US as a strategic partner to help increase their economy and regional presence. If the US works with China, Russia will not see diplomacy with the US as beneficial.**

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

**Their MacLeod card says that the Status Quo involvement with Russia solves the Syrian conflict because current Russian-US approach to diplomatic solutions are working. The affirmative's plan causes a shift in current Trump diplomatic engagement, causing the impacts.**

**2 Link: Trump's current strategy of getting close to Russia gets derailed if he turns toward China**

**NADEAU, DECEMBER 15TH, 2016** [James Nadeau, European affairs advisor and foreign policy analyst and has been featured in The Kyiv Post and the Hill, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/12/15/trump-courting-russia-contain-china/>]

Stone boasted on Twitter that Hillary campaign chairman John Podesta would have some "time in the barrel," and Podesta's emails were [hacked](#) by Russian groups and then posted on Wikileaks. **Trump himself has on multiple occasions showered Putin with praise, a favor that was reciprocated by the Russian President.**

**At the same time Trump is cozying up to Russia, he is taking an increasingly rougher tone with China.** As he has made abundantly clear while on the campaign trail, he considers China a serious—if not the most serious—threat to the United States.

First and foremost, **he identified China as an economic threat**, bent on undermining America's global economic pre-eminence by [inventing](#) the concept of global warming in order to reduce the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. He also repeatedly blasted China for "taking our jobs" and [accused](#) the Middle Kingdom of "illegal dumping." Add to that the fact that Trump [reversed](#) in early December decades of established U.S. policy towards

China by accepting a congratulatory call from Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen. After the call, he openly called into [question](#) America's adherence to China's "One China" policy.

If Trump advisors are indeed right, and the phone call with Taiwan was [long planned](#), then the **President-elect's reasoning behind staffing the White House with pro-Russian hacks becomes quite clear: breaking apart the budding Moscow-Beijing alliance.**

Seen in this light, **aligning with Russia is** not an expression of subservience to Vladimir Putin, but instead **a strategic calculus of the Trump administration meant to contain China. Due to geographical proximity and historical animosity, Russia and China are acutely aware of the threat they pose to each other.** In Trump's view, faced with a revisionist Beijing, Moscow and Washington are natural allies.

China has always been [suspicious](#) of Russia's intentions, because Moscow remains firmly anchored in the West. In the words of a Chinese academic, **"If the next U.S. president shows more respect to Russia and is less tough toward Moscow, the Kremlin's 'turn to the East' will very likely swing to the West."**

It seems that time has come. While Trump has indicated that he is hoping for more engagement against China from regional allies, especially [Japan](#), some of America's allies no longer seem to be inclined to follow Washington's lead. When the Australian government declined to comment on Trump's overtures to Taiwan, citing "national interest" as justification, eyebrows were raised in astonishment. But when looking at the economic data it makes sense: Australia is the **"developed world's most-China dependent economy"**, owing much of its 25 years of uninterrupted economic growth to Beijing's booming demand for commodities.

This helps to explain a string of pro-Chinese decisions taken by Malcolm Turnbull, from agreeing to a 99-year Chinese [lease](#) of parts of the Port of Darwin to rejecting a \$40 billion Japanese bid to build Australia's new submarine fleet. With China being the [most important](#) trading partner for Australia, it appears that Beijing has made its influence in Australia stick. For incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, China's growing clout in Australia and across the Asia-Pacific will make strengthening U.S. alliances with trusted allies like Japan a priority.

**For both the U.S. and Russia, strategic alignment is a way to keep the looming China threat in check. While Trump will likely disengage from Europe, he is likely to continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific and China's containment. Thus, the strategic encirclement that China suspected the U.S. would pursue under Obama's pivot to Asia will continue**, albeit in an altered form – not primarily via the control of Pacific island chains by the U.S. and its allies, but **through Beijing's immediate neighbor, Russia.**



## 2NC/1NR AT #4—Fix Tough Issues First

They say \_\_\_\_\_, but  
[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

**1. Extend our \_\_\_\_\_ evidence.**  
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their \_\_\_\_\_ evidence because:  
[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

- (it’s newer)                      (the author is more qualified)                      (it has more facts)
- (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself)                      (history proves it to be true)
- (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)
- (                      )                      (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

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[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

and this reason matters because:

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### **2 Diplomatic Capital is limited—adding other issues makes doing both impossible**

**ANDERSON AND GREWELL, 2001** [Terry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute; and Bishop, Research associate @ Political Economy Research Center; "It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty," Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall 2001, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427, Nexis]

Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "**Because diplomatic currency is finite... it is critically**

**important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount**

**importance to the nation.** Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies."40

## 2NC/1NR AT #5 ISIS Threat Exaggerated

They say the ISIS threat is exaggerated, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

### 1. Extend our \_\_\_\_\_ evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their \_\_\_\_\_ evidence because:

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

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[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

and this reason matters because:

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### 2 ISIS can get access to nuclear material and make havoc

**Tucker, March 2016** [Patrick, deputy editor for The Futurist. Tucker has written about emerging technology in Slate, The Sun, MIT Technology Review, Wilson Quarterly, The American Legion Magazine, BBC News Magazine, Utne Reader, 3/29, <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/03/nuclear-armed-isis-its-not-farfetched-expert-say/127039/?oref=d-river>]

The murder of a security guard at a Belgian nuclear facility just two days after the Brussels attacks, coupled with evidence that Islamic State operatives had been watching researchers there, has re-ignited fears about ISIS and nuclear terrorism. Some experts, including ones cited by the New York Times and others, dismiss the possibility that ISIS could make even a crude nuclear bomb. But Matthew Bunn, the co-principal investigator at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Belfer Center, says that the threat is quite real. Belgium has seen numerous suspicious events related to nuclear material and facilities. In August 2014, a worker at the Doel-4 nuclear power reactor opened a valve and drained a turbine of lubricant. The valve wasn’t near any nuclear material, but the act caused at least \$100 million in damage and perhaps twice that. Later, Belgian authorities discovered that a man named Ilyass Boughalab had left his job at

Doel-4 to join the Islamic State in Syria. (His last background check was 2009.) In November, shortly after the Paris attacks, Belgian authorities arrested a man named Mohammed Bakkali and discovered that he had video surveillance footage of an expert at Belgium's SCK-CEN nuclear research facility in Mol. It now seems that the footage was collected by Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui, two of the suicide bombers in the recent Brussels attacks. Then on March 24, a guard was found shot at Belgium's national radioactive elements institute at Fleurus. A Belgian prosecutor declared the death unrelated to terrorism and denied reports that the guard's security pass had been stolen and hastily de-activated. No matter what happened at Fleurus,

**mounting evidence points to ISIS's intention to cause nuclear havoc, whether by damaging a nuclear facility, spiking a conventional bomb with radioactive materials, or even building a fission bomb with highly enriched uranium.**

The first concern is that sabotage could create a Fukushima-like environment in central Europe. But to pull that off, Bunn writes in a blog post obtained prior to publication by Defense One, militants, criminals or terrorists would need a lot of specialized knowledge of the plant's security features and measures and how to defeat them. Just before the most recent attack in Belgium, SCK-CEN deployed armed troops to Belgium's four nuclear sites. Dirty Bombs But beefing up security at explicitly nuclear sites still leaves a lot of radioactive material less well protected. "Radiological materials are available in many locations where they would be much easier to steal, in hospitals, industrial sites, and more," than at the SCK-CEN center, Bunn wrote. Such materials can allow a terrorist to turn a regular-size blast into a catastrophe that renders an entire area essentially poisonous, greatly increasing the costs of cleanup and the long-term danger to survivors, first responders, etc. In 1987, four people died in the Brazilian city of Goiânia from exposure to cesium salt, derived from junked medical equipment. Bunn points to a recent report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which notes that the material to make a dirty bomb exists in "tens of thousands of radiological sources located in more than 100 countries around the world." In 2013 and 2014, there were 325 incidents of radioactive materials being lost, stolen, or in some way unregulated or uncontrolled, according to the report, which cites estimates from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. One material of particular concern is Cesium-137, or Cs-137. A byproduct of fission that's commonly used in radiation cancer therapy, "it exists in many places much less well protected than SCK-CEN," Bunn writes.

**The ultimate nightmare takes the form of a nuclear bomb composed of highly enriched uranium.**

Bunn wrote that stealing highly enriched uranium from SCK-CEN would have been very difficult for the Brussels suicide bombers. And yet, he wrote, "The Times story largely dismissed – wrongly, in my view – the idea that the HEU at SCK-CEN might have been the terrorists' ultimate objective, saying that the idea that terrorists could get such material and make a crude nuclear bomb 'seems far-fetched to many experts.'" Citing a recent Belfer Center report, he wrote, "repeated government studies, in the United States and elsewhere, have concluded that this is not far-fetched." One key passage in the report offered this insight, that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 13 incidents of the "illegal possession, sale, or movement" of highly enriched uranium occurred between 1993-2014. None of those involved material over a kilogram, not nearly enough to build a nuclear bomb. But "Incidents involving attempts to sell nuclear or other radioactive material indicate that there is a perceived demand for such material. The number of successful transactions is not known and therefore it is difficult to accurately characterize an 'illicit nuclear market.'" It's hard to tell how successful an assault on a facility like SCK-CEN would be if attempted by two lone gunmen, even if they had kidnapped an expert. But ISIS's attraction to nuclear material, and perhaps even a nuclear bomb, seems to be growing.

### **3 Even if ISIS can't get nuclear weapons the Syrian conflict kills 440 people a day—this humanitarian crisis 100% probable and must be stopped**

**Vox World News, February 2016** [Major global news outlet, "Syria's ceasefire: what it means and doesn't", February 11, <http://www.vox.com/2016/2/11/10975722/syria-ceasefire-munich>]

The Syrian war, it is important to remember, primarily matters for the vast and terrible human suffering it causes. The violence has killed an estimated 470,000 people, or 2 percent of the population. That number just a year and a half ago was 250,000, meaning **about 440 people die every day.** Beyond that, Syrians suffer mass displacement and face extreme poverty, disease outbreaks, and hunger. The city of Aleppo is facing potential mass starvation under a siege by Assad regime forces. This is not going to end the world's worst ongoing war, substantially alleviate the world's worst humanitarian crisis, or change the fundamental calculus by which the war is a stalemate likely doomed to last years. But just a single day of expanded humanitarian access or of ceasefire is thus a welcome reprieve for Syrians. It is not peace, and it is not justice, but it's something.

## 2NC/1NR AT #6—Case Outweighs

A. Magnitude: Our impact is bigger than their impact because:

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B. Timeframe: Our impact is faster than their impact because:

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C. Probability: Our impact is more likely to happen because:

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D. Turns the Case: Our impact causes their impact because:

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**2AC Affirmative Answers to Diplomatic  
Capital Disadvantage (January 2017  
Update)**

## 2AC Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage Answers

### 1 NO INTERNAL LINK: WE CAN'T PREDICT ANYTHING ABOUT TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE HIS CABINET IS DIVIDED AND TRUMP HAS NO KNOWLEDGE TO DIRECT DIPLOMACY

**SLATE, DECEMBER 23<sup>RD</sup>, 2016** (prominent online news magazine, Fred Kaplan, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/war\\_stories/2016/12/trump\\_s\\_inexperience\\_and\\_a\\_squabbling\\_cabinet\\_could\\_leave\\_u\\_s\\_foreign\\_policy.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/12/trump_s_inexperience_and_a_squabbling_cabinet_could_leave_u_s_foreign_policy.html))

**Judging from Donald Trump's Cabinet picks, the president-elect's foreign policy is likely to be in shambles—the product more of internecine squabbles (and who wins which ones) than of any thought-through strategy.**

**For this reason, many of his actual policies, or even the way they're formed, are at this point unpredictable. Because his national security team seems ill-suited to settling squabbles, many decisions—probably more than the president-elect imagines—will have to be made by Trump himself. And because Trump has no grounding whatsoever in these sorts of issues, that makes the course of the coming years more unpredictable still.**

Most administrations, especially in the beginning, are racked with internecine disputes, reflecting the institutional interests of the departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and so forth. But **the likely disputes in the Trump administration will be rooted** less in bureaucratic politics than **in the strong personalities of the Cabinet secretaries**, based on their well-rewarded life-experiences.

**Trump's secretaries have no allegiances to the departments they'll be running.** (His pick as secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has contempt for the Foggy Bottom pinstripes who tried to block his grand schemes as Exxon Mobil's CEO.) Global moguls, three- and four-star generals, hedge-fund billionaires—quite apart from their respective merits or lack thereof, these personality types are not accustomed to deference on matters in which they have strong interest or the slightest pretense of knowledge.

### 2. NO LINK – China will not distract Trump from focusing on the Middle East with Russia and he will defer to Russian diplomacy in Syria.

**MACLEOD, DEC 15TH, 2016** [Alasdair, stockbroker since 1970, consultant at many offshore institutions, and was an Executive Director at an offshore bank in Guernsey and Jersey, "Even before he takes office, President-elect Trump is turning the world upside down," <https://wealth.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/trump-russia-and-china>]

Rather like super-tankers that need seven miles to stop, regional powers are also finding it hard to adjust to these new realities, but adjust they surely will. European governments and NATO members will have had background briefings, but the normal channels for this, the CIA, the US Military advisers and American diplomats are not on Trump's page, so confusion still reigns. But one thing is becoming clear: **Trump will not be diverted from a general policy of détente and de-escalation of military presence in both Europe and the Middle East.**

The process of détente is reasonably predictable. A summit with Russia to agree strategic arms limitations (called SALT3 perhaps?) is a proven path to follow. It should be a step-by-step process scheduled over five or ten years, with pre-agreed conditions designed to satisfy concerns in the Baltic States and Poland that Russia might attempt border-creep. For their part the Russians must agree Ukraine's independence (excepting the Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, which should be formally ceded to Russia). Ukraine and Belorussia will be independent buffer states between Russia and the European

Union. Under a SALT3 both NATO and Russia will agree to a phased withdraw of all military hardware other than limited ground troops and their associated equipment.

**In the Middle East, America will concede that Syria remains in the Russian sphere of influence, and will withdraw all support for rebel organisations. This is no more than reality. China, doubtless, will help in the physical reconstruction of Syria in due course.** Agreement will be sought as to the means of destroying Daesh. Beyond that, **a reduced American presence in the region will continue to ensure security for Israel and the Gulf states. Already, the British have announced they will step up their presence in the region, which should also contribute to regional stability.**

Iran should be persuaded by Russia to take a more constructive approach to peace with Sunni states, such as Saudi Arabia, and towards Israel. This could be difficult, but should be possible, given Iran has become considerably more moderate since the days of Ahmadinejad, particularly if the right tone from America is forthcoming. Iran's days of hiding from western sanctions behind Russia will be over, and should be replaced with an emphasis on trade. And Saudi Arabia can no longer afford to wage wars, such as that in the Yemen, contributing to a less belligerent outcome.

All this is practical, possible and predictable. Behind the change in geopolitical reality for the Middle East is the fact that Peak Oil is being pushed further into the future. Not only are large new oil fields still being discovered (such as the Kashagan Field in the north of the Caspian Sea), but modern technology is bringing other forms of ecologically-friendly energy supplies on stream and higher prices will unlock shale oil supplies. **The strategic importance of the Middle East has therefore declined, particularly since insignificant quantities of oil from the region go to America. And with that decline goes less need for geostrategic intervention by the US.**

For the first time since the Six Day War in 1967 **there is a realistic possibility of stability in the area,** assuming the super-powers take a constructive approach to détente, and are willing to jointly police the region.

### **3. DIPLOMACY FAILS - THE US CAN'T RELY ON RUSSIA AS A PARTNER IN FIGHTING ISIS IN SYRIA**

**FOREIGN POLICY, NOVEMBER 17TH, 2016** (prominent publication on foreign affairs, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/17/trumps-syria-strategy-would-be-a-disaster>)

Meanwhile, **Trump's suggestion to partner with Russia in "smashing" the Islamic State is little more than a non sequitur, given Russia's near-consistent focus on everything but the jihadi group. According to recent data** monitoring airstrikes across Syria, **only 8 percent of areas targeted by Russian airstrikes** between Oct. 12 and Nov. 8 **belonged to the Islamic State.** With only one brief exception — the capture of Palmyra from the jihadi group during an internationally imposed cessation of hostilities — **the Kremlin's focus has unequivocally and consistently been on fighting Syria's mainstream opposition, not the Islamic State.**

**4 Link Turn: Vegetables First! If China is so challenging, Obama needs to get that off his plate first. This will be seen as a huge victory and he can now directly focus on the Middle East.**

**5. No impact: the ISIS threat is exaggerated—MANY reasons**

**Mueller, 2015** [John, senior fellow at the Cato Institute think tank, "Why the ISIS threat is totally overblown", July 23, <http://theweek.com/articles/567674/why-isis-threat-totally-overblown>]

Outrage at the tactics of ISIS is certainly justified. But fears that it presents a worldwide security threat are not. Its numbers are small, and it has differentiated itself from al Qaeda in that it does not seek primarily

to target the "far enemy," preferring instead to carve out a state in the Middle East for itself, mostly killing fellow Muslims who stand in its way. In the process, it has alienated virtually all outside support and, by holding territory, presents an obvious and clear target to military opponents. A year ago, the main fear was that foreign militants who had gone to fight with ISIS would be trained and then sent back to do damage in their own countries. However, there has been scarcely any of that. In part, this is because, as Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro have detailed in a Brookings Institution report, foreign fighters tend to be killed early (they are common picks for suicide missions); often become disillusioned, especially by in-fighting in the ranks; and do not receive much in the way of useful training for terrorist exercises back home. It might also be added that ISIS videos exultantly show foreign fighters burning their passports to demonstrate their terminal commitment to the cause — hardly a good idea if they want to return. In May 2015, an audio message apparently from the leader of ISIS exhorted Muslims either to join the ISIS ranks in the Middle East or to fight at home "wherever that may be." There was nothing about training people to return home to wreak havoc. More recently, the focus of fear has shifted from potential returnees to potential homegrown terrorists who might be inspired by ISIS's propaganda or example. However, ISIS could continue to be an inspiration even if it was weakened or destroyed. And, as terrorism specialist Max Abrahms notes, "lone wolves have carried out just two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist incidents over the last four decades." There has also been a trendy concern about the way ISIS uses social media. However, as Byman and Shapiro and others have pointed out, the foolish willingness of would-be terrorists to spill their aspirations and their often childish fantasies on social media has been, on balance, much to the advantage of the police seeking to track them. However, ISIS's savvy use of social media and its brutality have had a major impact on two important American groups: public officials and the media. Sen. Dianne Feinstein has insisted, "The threat ISIS poses cannot be overstated" — effectively proclaiming hyperbole on the subject to be impossible, as columnist Dan Froomkin observes. Equally inspired, Sen. Jim Inhofe, born before World War II, has extravagantly claimed that "we're in the most dangerous position we've ever been in" and that ISIS is "rapidly developing a method of blowing up a major U.S. city." And on Michael Smerconish's CNN program last weekend, former Homeland Security chief Tom Ridge issued the evidence-free suggestion that the recent tragic killings in Chattanooga followed a "directive" from ISIS. The media have generally been more careful and responsible about such extrapolations, and sometimes articles appear noting that some American and foreign intelligence officials think that "the actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of television punditry and alarmist statements by politicians." But the media remain canny about weaving audience-grabbing references about the arrestingly diabolical ISIS into any story about terrorism.

**6. Impact Calculus:**

A. Magnitude: Our impact is bigger than their impact because:

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B. Timeframe: Our impact is faster than their impact because:

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C. Probability: Our impact is more likely to happen because:

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D. Turns the DA: Our impact causes their impact because:

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# 1AR Extensions to 2AC #1: Can't Predict Trump Foreign Policy

**1. EXTEND OUR SLATE EVIDENCE – TRUMP'S CABINET IS DIVIDED AND TRUMP'S ADMINISTRATION HAS NO FOREIGN POLICY TO SPEAK OF. PREDICTIONS ARE USELESS.**

**2. NO INTERNAL LINK: TRUMP HAS NO DIPLOMATIC CAPITAL AND HIS "DEAL-MAKER" APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY REQUIRES BUILDING MANY NEW RELATIONSHIPS HIS INEXPERIENCED TEAM DOESN'T HAVE**

**SLATE, DECEMBER 23<sup>RD</sup>, 2016** (Fred Kaplan, prominent online news magazine, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/war\\_stories/2016/12/trump\\_s\\_inexperience\\_and\\_a\\_squabbling\\_cabinet\\_could\\_leave\\_u\\_s\\_foreign\\_policy.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/12/trump_s_inexperience_and_a_squabbling_cabinet_could_leave_u_s_foreign_policy.html))

**Trump's foreign policy team has no such clear orders or direction.** Even **Trump's bold slogans don't easily translate into action.** For instance, "Bomb the shit out of ISIS!" **Military officers** can produce plans and charts consistent with that order—but they **will also ask questions** (as will Mattis, who is far more sophisticated than his "Mad Dog" nickname suggests): **What are the goals of this operation (to destroy ISIS or to degrade it, over how long a period of time)?** What are acceptable risks of civilian damage? **What is the long-term plan after the bombing?** The staffs can quantify the risks; Mattis and the **others can offer recommendations. But Trump will have to decide.**

**The same is true with his** mandate for **foreign economic policy:** "Bring factory jobs back home! Renegotiate trade deals that hurt American jobs! Penalize countries that refuse to do so!" Again, there will be questions: What kinds of factory jobs? At what cost in, say, consumer prices? (Apple could build iPhones in America, but how much more will customers pay for them?) In these new trade deals, what are we willing to give the other sides in exchange for their giving us more? These are matters for trade negotiators to fine-tune—and let's stipulate that Trump hires really skilled negotiators. But **the bottom lines of these bargaining sessions have to be decided, ahead of time, by Trump.**

**Trump's whole approach to deal-making (and Tillerson's too) is bilateral—nation to nation, leader to leader, one nation and leader at a time. This may be fine for real-estate transactions and oil-drilling contracts, but it's usually not fine for deals concerning the broad interests of American security or the American economy.** Given our position as a maritime power with global interests, we usually do better negotiating multilateral treaties with allies—which requires an entirely different approach that seeks consensus more than profit-maximizing. **Some people in Trump's Cabinet understand this** as second nature (for instance, Mattis); **others don't (for instance, Tillerson, though he could learn—the question is whether he'll want to).**

## 1AR Extensions to 2AC #3: Diplomacy Fails

**1. Extend our 2AC Foreign Policy evidence. Russia has done nothing to fight ISIS and doesn't want to – it only wants to prop up Syria's government to maintain influence.**

**2. NO INTERNAL LINK: IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE TILLERSON'S ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH RUSSIA ON SYRIA FOR TWO REASONS – FIRST, HE MIGHT NOT EVEN BE APPROVED BY CONGRESS. SECOND, HE HAS NO EXPERIENCE AND DOESN'T SHARE TRUMP'S VISION**

**SLATE, DECEMBER 13TH, 2016** (prominent online news magazine, Fred Kaplan, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/war\\_stories/2016/12/rex\\_tillerson\\_secretary\\_of\\_state\\_what\\_s\\_good\\_for\\_exxon\\_is\\_bad\\_for\\_the\\_country.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/12/rex_tillerson_secretary_of_state_what_s_good_for_exxon_is_bad_for_the_country.html))

Tillerson's unbridled internationalism may serve as a counter to the nativist protectionism of Trump's rhetoric, but it may go too far the other way. Cultivating a feel for national interests would require not only an extraordinarily agile mind but also—as a first step—some notion of what "national interests" are, a concept that has rarely weighed on the mind of Tillerson's boss-to-be, either.

Tillerson is a dealmaker, and Trump likes dealmakers. But the key questions are: What kind of deals—and made in whose interest? Tillerson has made big deals with dozens of leaders around the world, and Trump has said he's impressed that Tillerson "knows all the players." But it's a fallacy to think that knowing the players gets you the deal, much less the right kind of deal.

Trump also recently said that his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, could negotiate peace between Israel and the Palestinians because he "knows the players" in the region. I suspect Trump really believes there's a connection (leaving aside the fact that Kushner is an unknown in the region), but this reveals only how little Trump knows about Middle Eastern politics, where everybody knows everybody, yet no peace is in sight. It's true that knowing the players—knowing the right person to call and knowing something about that person, having done business with that person—can open doors and get talks going. But familiarity doesn't breed the deal. No two diplomats on the planet have a closer personal relationship than Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Yet the two of them can't make a deal on Syria because their two countries, much less the other countries in the region, have conflicting interests. Even in successes, their friendship was only part of the story: It probably did help smooth things in the prolonged talks that led to the Iran nuclear deal, but it did so only because the United States and Russia shared a long-standing interest in nuclear nonproliferation.

Trump now faces a real challenge in getting this nomination through. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which must confirm the appointment by majority vote before it even goes to the floor, is stacked with Russia hawks who are very suspicious of Tillerson's close ties to Putin and his opposition to sanctions—especially now, in the aftermath of the CIA's assessment that Russia's "senior-most officials" coordinated the hacking and leaking of the Democratic National Committee's email in order to help hand the election to Trump, whose own fond views of Putin are well-known and disturbing.


# **China Relations Disadvantage (January 2017 Update)**

## Vocabulary

**Relations:** Think relationship. This DA is based on the US and China being cooperative. If relations are high, that means that the US and China will work together on pressing problems. If they are low, then the countries are less likely to fix issues.

**Nuclear Proliferation:** Proliferation means to spread so nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons. This means that more countries get access to full weapons and nuclear materials thus increasing the risk of nuclear use.


### Number of Nuclear Weapons by Country



**People’s Liberation Army (PLA):** The Chinese armed forces. Basically the accumulation of all the Chinese military. It is the largest military in the world.


**Changing the Guard**

China’s People’s Liberation Army personnel, in millions, since 1949



Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

**South China Seas (SCS):** Part of the Pacific Ocean just southeast of China. It is near Taiwan, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Vietnam. A great deal of goods are moved through the area and there’s supposedly a lot of oil in the sea bed. There are serious disputes about who actually owns it and thus many countries are fighting over it.



**Senkaku Islands**: Islands in the East China sea that have no one living on them. The US gave them to Japan, but China disagrees. These islands, like the South China Sea, are areas where fighting might erupt.

**Xi Jinping (She jin-PING)**: General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of China, and the Chairman of China's Central Military Commission. He's like Obama, but even more powerful since China does not have the same political structure as the US. Essentially, he's the president of China.

**Chinese Communist Party (CCP)**: Main political party of China. They have large control over the entire country and believe in a strong government with control over the people and economy. Xi Jinping is the leader of the party.

**AT=Answers To**

## **1NC- China Relations Disadvantage Shell**

**A. UNIQUENESS: CHINA IS GIVING TRUMP A GRACE PERIOD NOW, BUT IT'S SHORT-LIVED: WE ARE AT A KEY POINT IN RELATIONS**

**NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 19<sup>TH</sup>, 2016**

<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/asia/-china-donald-trump-power.html>

**Pressures on Mr. Xi are likely to grow if Mr. Trump continues publicly excoriating China,** especially on territorial issues, like Taiwan and the South China Sea, where public sentiment often favors a tough response.

**“China tends to give the new leader a grace period to settle in,”** Ms. Weiss said, citing her research about China’s response to elections and new leaders. **“Trump has moved more quickly to challenge and defy China** than other president-elects, however, **so the grace period could end quickly.”**

**A. <Insert plan-specific link>**

## B. Internal-Link: Maintaining good relations with China is critical to resolve almost every status quo impact including nuclear proliferation

**Gross, 2013** (Donald senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), former State Department official), 3/19 [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-china-relations\\_b\\_2891183.html?view=print&comm\\_ref=false](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-china-relations_b_2891183.html?view=print&comm_ref=false))

Better relations with China would support wide-reaching political reform and liberalization. They would undercut the repressive internal forces that legitimize one-party authoritarian rule as a means of protecting the country against foreign military threats, particularly from the United States. In the field of national security, through an ongoing process of mutual threat reduction, the United States can ensure that China is a future partner and not a danger to the interests of America and its allies. The greatest benefit is that **the U.S. would avoid a military conflict for the foreseeable future** with a country it now considers a major potential adversary. Other critical security benefits to the United States and its allies include:

- Significantly reducing China's current and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus securing Taiwan's democracy;
- Utilizing China's considerable influence with North Korea to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and missile development programs;
- Increasing security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues, allowing the United States to leverage Chinese capabilities for meeting common transnational threats such as climate change, energy insecurity, pandemic disease, cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation;
- Curtailing cyberattacks by the Chinese military on U.S.-based targets as well as enforcing stringent measures against private individuals and groups in China that engage in cyber-hacking;
- Having China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an independent international judicial body to prevent festering conflicts over uninhabited islands and energy resources from escalating to armed conflict; and
- Reducing the scope, scale, and tempo of China's military modernization programs by discrediting the rationale for conducting a focused anti-U.S. buildup, especially since the country has so many other pressing material needs. In his second term, President Obama should seize the opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-China relations -- by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, achieves greater mutually beneficial Sino-American cooperation, and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries. This approach would enable the United States to maintain an effective military presence in the Asia Pacific in coming years, despite defense budget cuts, while also rebalancing economic and political resources to the region to ensure stability and mutual prosperity.

# 1NC- China Relations Disadvantage Human Rights Link

## **The affirmative's insistence on pressuring China to adopt human rights policies backfires- leads to increased hostility and collapses the CCP**

**Wyne, 2013** Ali, contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a global fellow at the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. "Some Thoughts on the Ethics of China's Rise." 8/14 [http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics\\_online/0084](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0084)

The more contentious topic, of course, is the role that human rights should play in U.S.-China relations. While the United States should neither hesitate to articulate its differences with China on issues of human rights, nor refrain from encouraging those trends within China that are promoting greater citizen empowerment, it should not urge China to democratize or condition its interactions with China on the leadership's acceptance of core American values. A country that is not yet 250 years old should appreciate the possibility that a country several millennia old may have its own strain of exceptionalism. Furthermore, attempts to democratize China could backfire. One of the foremost China watchers, former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, declares that it will not "become a liberal democracy; if it did, it would collapse." While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is willing to experiment with democratic reforms in "villages and small towns," he explains, it fears that large-scale democratization "would lead to a loss of control by the center over the provinces, like [during] the warlord years of the 1920s and '30s.3 Whatever challenges an increasingly capable and assertive China might pose, a weak China in the throes of chaos would be even more problematic, especially now that its growth is vital to the health of the global economy. It is China's ongoing integration into the international system and attendant exposure to information technology that hold the greatest promise for improvements to its human rights climate. Since the late 1970s, the CCP has implicitly conditioned its delivery of rapid growth to the Chinese people on their acquiescence to its rule. The problem is that citizens' priorities become more sophisticated as their day-to-day situations grow less exigent. Those in dire poverty are quite likely to censor themselves in exchange for food, shelter, and other necessities. As they enter the middle class, however, and become less preoccupied with the demands of survival, they naturally think more about critiquing government policy. Within this transition lies a fundamental challenge for the CCP: the very bargain that it implemented to forestall challenges to its rule is enabling greater numbers of Chinese to pose such challenges. There were only 20 million Internet users in China in 2000; today, there are more than 560 million.

## 1NC- China Relations Disadvantage - North Korea Link

**China and North Korea are still major trading partners and allies. The shared border between them, means China will always have ties with North Korea. If the U.S. pressures China to change this relationship, it will appear coercive**

**CNN, March 2016** March 31, "North Korea sanctions: Is China enforcing them?"

<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/31/asia/china-north-korea-border-dandong/>

The caravan of trucks rumbles across the narrow bridge, inching along as they wait their turn to enter North Korea. This is the scene every morning from the banks of the Yalu River, in the Chinese border city of Dandong. The trucks, and more specifically the goods within them, represent North Korea's economic lifeline. **China is the only country left that is willing to do significant trade with Kim Jong Un's regime. And that relationship is under more scrutiny than ever,** since new sanctions on the regime were implemented by the U.N. Security Council in March. The sanctions are aimed at curbing North Korea's nuclear program following an international uproar after North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb and long-range missiles. The sanctions include universal inspections of all cargo to and from North Korea, and a ban on buying North Korean coal and raw mineral exports if any profits might go to sanctioned programs. China helped draft the tougher new guidelines, and says it will vigorously implement them. **But China has been criticized in the past for not enforcing previous sanctions.** Experts agree that if the sanctions are to be at all effective, China must uphold them stringently. **China is North Korea's only major ally, and accounts for more than 70% of the country's total trade volume.** It's in border cities like Dandong that these sanctions will be enforced. On the Chinese side of the border, you can see the small customs area situated just before the only bridge that goes in and out, called the "Friendship Bridge." All truck traffic passes through there, but it's difficult to see if inspections are taking place. CNN contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provincial officials in Liaoning, where Dandong is located, to ask how inspections were being conducted. Both declined to provide details. CNN followed the trucks to a loading yard, and watched as Chinese goods were placed on board, ready to be shipped back across the river. No one at the yard would speak with us, and a security guard blocked us from filming. The Chinese say inspections are effective, but CNN couldn't independently verify that.

## **1NC China Relations Disadvantage - Currency Manipulation Link**

**China wants to be perceived as a fair trader – the plan puts them on blast and makes them fear sanctions**

**Voice of America News, September 2016** 9/3 Saibal Dasgupta <http://www.voanews.com/a/g20-china-trade/3492531.html>

**China is spearheading the campaign for openness because it fears that Chinese exporters would face stiffer resistance in Western countries due to of the rise of protectionist sentiments.** Support for protectionism was evident during the Brexit debate in Britain, and in the ongoing presidential race in the United States. Parts of Europe, including Germany, have seen protests by jobless steel workers, blaming China for their plight.

**"China is worried about growing resistance to its goods in foreign markets. But its own protectionism is politically too costly for President Xi Jinping to alter,"** David Kelly, head of consulting firm China Policy told VOA.

**China is anxious to strengthen its image as a fair trader** because of accusations that the government subsidizes local industries to give Chinese exporters a price advantage on international markets. **It is this impression that leads to many countries imposing anti-dumping sanctions on Chinese goods, which is a major hurdle for exporters in China.**

**"Chinese leaders are more interested in consolidating China's image as a country which is credible,** stable and well-resourced financially," Kelly said.

**Beijing wants Western nations to lift anti-dumping sanctions against Chinese goods but would do little to create a level playing field for foreign investors,** analysts said.

## **2NC/1NR- China Relations Disadvantage - North Korea Link Extensions**

China is economically dependent on North Korea. This means the plan would be viewed as comprising China's economic growth, straining relations

**Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016** 2/18, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>

**China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea's total trade** volume (PDF). “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. **In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container shipping route to boost North Korea’s export of coal to China and China established a high-speed rail route between the Chinese border city of Dandong and Shenyang**, the provincial capital of China’s northeastern Liaoning province. In October 2015, the Guomenwan border trade zone opened in Dandong with the intention of boosting bilateral economic linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the Sinujiu special administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and 2002, respectively. **Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and tourism for the two neighbors—exchanges with North Korea make up 40 percent of the city’s total trade.** Due to North Korea’s increasing isolation, its dependence on China continues to grow, as indicated by the significant trade imbalance between the two countries. Some experts see the trade deficit as an indirect Chinese subsidy, given that North Korea cannot finance its trade deficit through borrowing.

# 2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #1

## Non-Unique: Relations Bad Now

**They say Relations are bad already, but**

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

**1. Extend our NEW YORK TIMES evidence.**

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

**It’s much better than their evidence because:**

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

- (it’s newer)** (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)  
 (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)  
 (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) **(it takes into account their argument)**  
 ( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

\_\_\_ **It’s most recent, from December 19<sup>th</sup>, and accounts for their Taiwan argument.**\_\_\_\_\_

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

**and this reason matters because:**

\_\_\_ **It says that China is still giving a grace period even after the Taiwan phone call, but the plan pushes them too far, causing our Impact, a collapse of all cooperation with China on issues like non-proliferation**\_\_\_\_\_

1. [Choose what YOU feel are the BEST 1 or 2 pieces of UNIQUENESS evidence in the next three pages to read in the 2NC or 1NR to extend this argument effectively]

**Trump made other positive moves that keep relations vulnerable but stable until China sees what his policy will be – all eyes are on the AFF PLAN**

**EDWARDS AND LAVINDER, DECEMBER 16TH, 2016**

[Will Edwards (an international producer at The Cipher Brief) & Kaitlin Lavinder (a reporter at The Cipher Brief).  
<https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/trump-russia-and-cia-allies-and-adversaries-confused-1091> MYY]

**Relations with China**, the United States’ largest geopolitical competitor, **are already on shaky grounds, following Trump’s** phone **conversation with the President of Taiwan, his questioning of the “One China” policy, and his criticism of China’s economic system. But on the other hand, Trump appointed China-friendly Terry Branstad, the Governor of Iowa, as U.S. Ambassador to China. This mixture of positive and negative developments in the U.S.-China relationship fuels uncertainty about future relations.** With Trump showing little faith in his Intelligence Community, **China may find it best to wait and see how official U.S. policy unfolds.**

**Trump's Taiwan phone call was bad, but China's going to give him chance to make a next move. The AFF PLAN is the WRONG move**

**WEISBROT, DECEMBER 23RD, 2016**

[Mark Weisbrot (a co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. *Seattle Times* <http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/even-before-taking-office-trump-has-made-a-mess-with-china/> MYY]

PRESIDENT-elect Donald **Trump's phone call earlier this month with** President Tsai Ing-wen of **Taiwan** sent shock waves throughout China and much of the world. For nearly four decades, it has been Washington's official policy to diplomatically recognize only China and not Taiwan, an island the mainland considers a breakaway province. In reality, though, the call **will be remembered as one of the worst diplomatic miscalculations of all time.** Trump's team also deserves blame, as apparently the long-distance chat wasn't just another foot-in-mouth Trump moment but was in fact a deliberate strategy shaped with lobbyist influence. Trump has indicated that by abandoning this policy and, in effect, threatening China, he'll be able to bargain for concessions from the Asian power. **And while the Chinese government responded with stern messaging, its actions have been relatively subdued. But don't be fooled: Chinese leaders are giving Trump a chance to chart a different course before he takes office Jan. 20.** Bullying may have helped Trump in his real estate career but it is not going to move China. The Chinese economy is now bigger than ours on a purchasing power parity basis, which is what matters when we are talking about such things as military expenditures. The cost of a Chinese-made plane or a Chinese pilot is considerably less than its U.S. dollar equivalent at current exchange rates in America. Trump's ostensible reason for the hard line against China is that he wants to negotiate a better deal for U.S. manufacturing, including for workers stateside.

**Don't believe "Insider" hype. Relations were already so bad under Obama that conflict was inevitable. Trump can only do better with a fresh approach**

**PROFESSOR XIANG, DECEMBER 27TH, 2016**

[Lanxin Xiang (a professor of international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva, Switzerland, and director of the Centre of One Belt and One Road Security Studies, at the China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation, Shanghai). *South China Morning Post* <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2056841/why-trumps-blunt-approach-will-put-us-relations-china-surer> MYY]

The "control and management" approach may imply at least two things: first, the realisation that **conflict with the US can no longer be avoided within the current framework of engagement;** the so-called Strategic and Economic Dialogue has contributed little to building mutual trust at summit meetings. **Beijing cannot continue dealing with the 'inside-the-beltway' US foreign policy establishment** Second, China's focus will have to shift towards maintaining a true strategic balance, as if during a cold war stalemate, with the single purpose of avoiding full-fledged confrontation. **Leaderships on both sides need a new approach, new type of analysts and policymakers to engage.** Beijing cannot continue dealing with **the "inside-the-beltway" US foreign policy establishment, whose utter failure in engaging China in the past eight years has pushed bilateral ties to the dangerous brink of naval confrontation. Enter Donald Trump.** Now that the Washington foreign policy establishment has been dealt a big blow by **Trump's election,** we **could see that the new administration,** with its mostly non-insider members, **despite its callous style and brutish rhetoric, may actually turn out to be an effective team for engaging China. It may thus be good news for Sino-US relations in the medium and long run.**

**Chinese President Xi and Trump are already establishing goals together****REUTERS, NOVEMBER 9TH, 2016** <http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-china/>

**Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Donald Trump** on winning the U.S. presidency, state TV reported on Wednesday, **telling him the two biggest economies in the world shared responsibility for promoting global development and prosperity. "I place great importance on the China-U.S. relationship, and look forward to working with you to uphold the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation," Xi told Trump** by phone.

**Their authors are exaggerating – Trump’s call with Taiwan fits our past pattern of relations**

**POMFRET, DECEMBER 9TH, 2016**

[John Pomfret (a former Washington Post bureau chief in Beijing, Washington Post, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-us-china-relations/2016/12/09/beeedb888-bccc-11e6-91ee-1addfe36cbe\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.275e52436568](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-us-china-relations/2016/12/09/beeedb888-bccc-11e6-91ee-1addfe36cbe_story.html?utm_term=.275e52436568) MYY)]

**When Trump took Taiwan’s call, the U.S. foreign policy establishment had a minor nervous breakdown. Vox warned of “disarray ” in U.S.-China relations. New York magazine raised the specter of a “diplomatic disaster.” Let’s take a deep breath and realize that the “status quo” between Taiwan and the United States has been evolving for decades.** In exchange for Chinese promises to help ease the United States out of Vietnam and counter the Soviet Union, officials from the Nixon and Carter administrations promised China that America would walk away from Taiwan, allowing China to absorb the island of 23 million people, which Beijing views as a renegade province. **Since then**, however, especially as U.S. presidents have come to understand that China’s political system has not moved in a positive direction, successive administrations have worked to better ties with Taiwan. Weapons sales to the island remain robust despite a promise to China in 1982 to slow them. Diplomatic contact has been upgraded. **Washington now supports granting Taiwan observer status at a variety of international organizations. Most Taiwanese can come to the United States without a visa. In that sense, Trump’s call was a logical continuation of a slowly evolving process of improved relations.** The big concern, however, is that China will use the call as an excuse to further bully Taiwan and that Trump will stand by.

## 2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #2 “Plan Helps China Relations”

They say They improve relations with China, but  
[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

**1. Extend our \_\_\_\_\_ evidence.**

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their evidence because:

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

- (it’s newer)                      (the author is more qualified)                      (it has more facts)
- (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself)                      (history proves it to be true)
- (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)
- ( \_\_\_\_\_ )                      (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

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[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

and this reason matters because:

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the short term the [Taiwan] government seems to be very excited about [Trump addressing 'one China'],” says Professor Tang Shaocheng, an international-relations expert at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University. “But the consequences — the reaction from Beijing — is still unpredictable.” Taiwan would bear the brunt of a metastasizing Sino-U.S. relationship, though Trump has never mentioned what the island’s citizens desire during his bating of the Chinese leadership. Instead, **the President-elect has treated the case like a business deal, jostling for the smallest advantage, while needling the world’s second largest economy over trade tariffs and alleged currency manipulation. “Trump is trying to get some more bargaining chips to use later with Beijing,”** adds Tang. “Taiwan is just a leverage point for Trump.” And Trump’s actions elsewhere are recasting the rules of the game and further imperiling the island’s people. The other headline of Trump’s nascent foreign policy is warming ties with Russia. Trump repeatedly praised President Vladimir Putin during his presidential campaign, flying in the face of the international condemnation prompted by Moscow’s 2014 annexing of the Crimea, not to mention its steadfast support for Syrian President Bashar Assad. On Wednesday, Trump named his candidate for Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson, the ExxonMobil chief with a long history of deals with the Kremlin, and who was awarded the Russian Order of Friendship in 2013. The nod raised eyebrows even within Trump’s own party. “I don’t know what Mr. Tillerson’s relationship with Vladimir Putin was,” Senator John McCain told Fox News on Saturday. “But I’ll tell you it is a matter of concern to me.” What exactly Trump hopes to gain from courting Putin is unclear. The real estate mogul may have been elected on promises to put “America first,” but Putin is a Russian nationalist of the deepest dye and unlikely to yield much of consequence to Washington. One theory is that Trump is maneuvering for a “reverse Nixon” strategy: teaming up with Moscow to isolate Beijing, in a mirror of U.S. policy to counter the Soviet Union in the 1970s. However, that is unlikely to bear fruit. According to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank, Beijing and Moscow have never been as close as they are today. “I would call them a ‘détente’ state of relations,” says Trenin. “That’s somewhere between a strategic partnership and a full-fledged alliance.” Chinese President Xi Jinping’s seminal One Belt, One Road economic strategy — a rekindling of the iconic land and maritime Silk Road through infrastructure and development projects — is dependent on rosy relations with Russia and particularly Central Asia, which is largely beholden to the Kremlin. Today, Russia is the world’s top oil exporter — accounting for 70% of all national exports — and its top customer is China, which bought 22 million tons in the first half of this year. Squabbles over disputed territory in Central Asia have been solved with surprising prudence and a raft of pipeline and other infrastructure deals have been struck. “Relations are robust and I can only see them getting stronger,” says Trenin. By contrast, the U.S. has little to offer Russia. But Trump’s fawning of Putin does have an effect. Trump announced Tillerson’s appointment just as Assad’s Russian-backed troops retook Aleppo, displacing thousands and reportedly slaughtering scores of innocents. But Beijing is most acutely aware that the Kremlin suffered few repercussion from its seizing of Crimea, other than economic sanctions it shrugged aside (and Trump could soon lift them at a stroke of his pen). If Trump wants to put ethics aside and talk realpolitik: What would the U.S. do if China decided to retake Taiwan? To rephrase: What could it do? The U.S. military is stronger than China’s overall, though a war in China’s coastal waters would be bloody and impossible to win. The Philippines, traditionally America’s staunchest ally, has become antagonistic with Washington and chummy with China since President Rodrigo Duterte took office this year. There are also resurgent calls to remove U.S. troops from bases in South Korea and Japan, who both list China as their largest trading partners. Beijing has built islands — dubbed unsinkable aircraft carriers — in the South China Sea, which new satellite images indicate contain significant weaponry. Not to forget that Trump campaigned on drawing down commitments on costly wars overseas. **“Xi is a tough guy and has shown unprecedented tolerance for Trump’s arrogance,” says Professor Shi Yinhong, director of the Center on American Studies at Beijing’s Renmin University. “But if Trump still wants to mess with China’s core interests after he becomes President, Sino-U.S. ties will suffer the greatest damage since [the resumption of diplomatic relations]. China will not compromise.”**

## **2NC/1NR China Relations Disadvantage AT: #4**

### **NO LINK: "Trump is a loose cannon"**

**They say China will inevitably be mad at Trump because he's a loose cannon, but**  
[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT'S SINGLE ARGUMENT]

**1. Extend our NEW YORK TIMES \_\_\_\_\_ evidence.**

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR'S NAME]

**It's much better than their Asia News Network evidence because:**

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR'S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it's newer)                      **(the author is more qualified)**                      (it has more facts)  
(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself)                      (history proves it to be true)  
**(their evidence has no facts)** (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)  
(                      )                      (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]

[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

\_\_\_The New York Times is a much more respected journalism source than the Asia News Network and our argument says China is giving Trump a grace period. Their evidence says we're "frenemies" now, but only speculates about why Trump would change that. \_\_\_\_\_

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

**and this reason matters because:**

\_\_\_It means China doesn't think Trump is a madman now, at least until after the PLAN. Bad relations aren't inevitable – the AFF uniquely causes our impacts of collapsing relations \_\_\_

- 2 [Choose one or two of the following pieces of evidence from the next 3 pages that YOU think are BEST to extend the argument, if you have time.]

**China is cautiously optimistic about Trump being practical**

**REUTERS, NOVEMBER 9TH, 2016** <http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-china/>

Certainly, **a Trump White House presents China with a range of new opportunities.** Decades of Hillary Clinton's criticism of China's human rights record and her insistence on U.S. interests in the South China Sea have made her a well-known, and not well-liked figure among Beijing's ruling elite.

**Chinese experts say some in Beijing believe Trump will prove a pragmatic businessman, willing to deal with China.**

"Any type of protectionist policy pursued will be a double-edged sword," said Ruan Zongze, a former Chinese diplomat now with the China Institute of International Studies, a think-tank affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. **"I think he will be very careful about this,"**

Moreover, **Trump's criticism of U.S. allies, including Japan,** for free-riding on U.S. security guarantees, **has offered China the tantalizing prospect of an American retrenchment from Asia.**

**"From a long-term perspective, this gives China more space to prove itself and it takes off some of the pressure on China,"** said Wang Yiwei, Director of the Institute of International Affairs at China's Renmin University.

**History proves China will take a “wait and see” approach toward Trump’s unpredictable WORDS, but will react strongly to POLICIES like the AFF PLAN that they dislike**

**MIURA AND PROFESSOR CHEN WEISS, 2017**

[Kacie Miura (a PhD candidate in political science at MIT) Jessica Chen Weiss (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell). “Will China Test Trump? Lessons from Past Campaigns and Elections.” *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2017) p 8-9

Drawing on China’s recent behavior toward newly elected leaders in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, **we expect China to adopt a wait-and-see stance toward the incoming Trump administration. During the campaign, Trump harshly criticized the current terms of U.S. trade and security commitments. However, his rhetoric was often inconsistent with that of his advisors** and out of step with the views of much of the Republican establishment. **Given this inconsistency, we expect Beijing to take a cautious approach toward the new administration,** just as it has toward other national leaders whose campaign rhetoric conflicted with other indicators of likely policy. Although the past is hardly an infallible guide to the future, **we do not expect China to probe the new administration,** as there is little evidence that China has sought to test or take advantage of newly elected leaders in the recent past. Chinese Perceptions of Campaign Rhetoric: Consistency and Change When evaluating the likelihood that a leader will follow through on campaign promises, we find that China sees a candidate’s campaign rhetoric as more credible when it is consistent with his or her past foreign policy statements and the reputation of his or her party and policy advisors. Candidates whose campaign remarks contradict their past record, the reputation of their party, and the views of their advisors are more often expected to renege on campaign pledges when confronted with the complex realities of governing.<sup>11</sup> When a candidate’s campaign rhetoric is inconsistent with other indicators, **China typically takes a “wait-and-see” approach, delaying judgment until after the candidate takes office and reveals intentions through subsequent actions. China adopted such an approach toward Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008) and Japan’s Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006),** leaders whose campaign rhetoric on China appeared opportunistic and contrasted sharply with their past behavior and actions. Observers in Beijing expressed deep skepticism toward Chen, whose moderate campaign stance contradicted his staunch, pro-independence reputation.<sup>12</sup> Conversely, Koizumi, who had a record of moderate statements toward China, adopted a tougher position on the campaign trail, which Chinese observers characterized as an attempt to cater to his party’s conservative right wing.<sup>13</sup> **Beijing used specific issues as litmus tests to assess whether these new leaders acknowledged cherished principles**—such as the existence of “One China” with Taiwan—and avoided taking symbolically provocative actions, such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japanese war criminals along with ordinary war dead. **In both cases, Beijing’s wait-and-see stance lasted for more than a year. Ultimately dissatisfied with the results of its efforts to influence these new leaders’ statements and actions on key issues, Beijing’s ensuing treatment was quite harsh.** Conversely, when there is consistency between a candidate’s campaign rhetoric and their past statements, actions, and the reputation of the party and policy advisors, a second important factor that appears to influence Beijing’s treatment of a new leader is whether he or she promised to change the China policy of the preceding administration. U.S. presidential candidates often seek to distinguish themselves from the incumbent, finding it difficult to “resist the siren song of tough promises to reverse their predecessors’ soft approach” toward China, as noted by former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Kurt Campbell and former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.<sup>14</sup>

**They LINK. We agree with the NEG that China has uncertainty about Trump. The AFF PLAN causes escalation when China views it as the start of a back-and-forth rivalry**

**STRABONE, DECEMBER 12TH, 2016**

[Matthew Strabone (an attorney and a partner of the Truman National Security Project) "Trump's Boardroom Diplomacy." *US News & World Report* <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/world-report/articles/2016-12-21/china-retaliated-due-to-donald-trumps-foreign-policy-bargaining> MYY]

Trump has made significant hay of his experience as a businessman, and poking at Beijing in perhaps its most sensitive area appears to be a move taken from the business world. Specifically, **Trump seems to want to treat China as a rival business that has no choice but to eventually come to the table and make a deal with him.** In this context, Trump may think that attempting to put Taiwan in play as a negotiable asset will provide him with a bargaining chip – a chip that can be traded for concessions in other areas of U.S.-China ties, perhaps regarding trade policy, North Korea or some other area where he wishes to make progress. **Such an approach may work in the business world, but nation states are not businesses, and core national interests can rarely be bargained away** for lower tariffs. **In fact, this approach may only exacerbate one critical ongoing issue in U.S.-China relations: a lack of understanding on the part of each nation as to how the other makes foreign policy. Confused by Trump's highly unorthodox moves, Beijing wasted little time in launching a provocation of its own** with its vehicle seizure in the South China Sea. Whereas China had reached some semblance of understanding regarding the rules of engagement with the Obama administration, Beijing may now feel that it is flying blind and thus may engage in further tit-for-tat activities simply to get a sense of where Trump will draw the line. **This sort of retaliatory approach to bilateral ties carries a significant risk of escalation, and when it is the two most powerful nations in the world involved, escalation is not a good outcome for anyone.** Additionally, this potential danger only adds to the preexisting uncertainty in the Western Pacific, and other countries in the region are predictably becoming increasingly nervous about rising tensions between the world's two premiere powers.



## 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Relations Disadvantage (January 2017 Update)

**1. NON-UNIQUE- Relations are bad already. Trump has already undone 35 years of diplomacy with China in one phone call with Taiwan**

**SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, DECEMBER 3RD, 2016**

<http://www.smh.com.au/world/donald-trump-blunders-into-conflict-over-taiwan-knowing-little-and-caring-less-20161203-gt39j5.html>

The following day the president-elect's transition team issued a jaunty statement confirming that Donald **Trump** had **arbitrarily upended 35 years of careful American diplomacy by speaking on the phone with the President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, conceivably putting the United States on a path that ends in direct confrontation with China over one of the most explosive geopolitical flashpoints on earth.**

**It is difficult to exaggerate how significant - and how provocative - this action was. China considers Taiwan to be a rogue province and has declared that it would go as far as using military force to prevent Taiwanese independence.** The US has for a generation danced a careful dance in support of Taiwan. It is the de facto guarantor of Taiwanese defence, but it does not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. **No US leader has officially spoken with a Taiwanese president in decades.**

**2. LINK TURN: <insert analysis as to why plan actually improves relations with China and refer to 1AC evidence>**

### 3. Our LINK TURN is UNIQUE because after Trump's initial provoking of China, they're looking for win-win policies like our plan to increase relations

#### **SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, DECEMBER 22ND, 2016**

[Liu Zhen (writer). "China's foreign minister urges Trump to respect Beijing's 'core interests', 'major concerns'."  
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2056576/chinas-foreign-minister-urges-trump-respect-beijings> MYY]

**Beijing and Washington should respect each other's "core interests" and "major concerns" so that the two countries can work together for win-win results, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi said** in an interview with the People's Daily. "China and the US will have respect and take care of each other's core interests and major concerns to ensure long and stable cooperation and realise mutual benefits and a win-win situation," Wang told the governing Communist Party's mouthpiece. **The comments came after US president-elect Donald Trump has made provocative gestures towards Beijing, including the threat of disregarding the one-China principle** to govern future policy towards Taiwan. **Trump's nomination of Peter Navarro** to head a newly-created White House council on trade has **also raised eyebrows** this week.

### 4. NO LINK: Their Disadvantage is inevitable – whether or not we make China angry with the plan, Trump is a loose cannon and they'll be angry anyway regardless

**ASIA NEWS NETWORK, DECEMBER 22ND, 2016** [<http://annx.asianews.network/content/editorial-trump-and-china-bumpy-ride-has-begun-35776> MYY]

**The rest of the world will have to fasten its seatbelts while the current, worrying clash of superpowers China and the United States plays itself out.** Although the saga of the **underwater drone** ended peaceably earlier this week, the **drama signalled that the competition between the two has entered a new era. With help from the ubiquitous social media, their diplomatic engagement is taking place in real time swiftly, unpredictably and amid considerable tension. The inauguration of President Donald Trump on January 20 is expected to see US-China ties transformed into a guarded quasi-friendship requiring day-to-day reassessment. The stability that prevailed during the eight years of the Obama administration is unlikely to survive. Trump is given to knee-jerk reactions and ill-considered grandstanding for the sake of quick gain and publicity, as well as for his brash pursuit of "the art of the deal", none of which bodes well for America's relations with Beijing.** Still a month from taking office, **Trump has already endangered his country's long-standing recognition of the "One China Policy"** by accepting a phone call from Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wan, a breach of protocol adopted after Washington formally recognised communist China in the early 1970s. President Barack Obama immediately warned that any shift from this policy would have a serious impact on American dealings with Beijing, an important trading partner and backer of the US economy. Aiming to renegotiate extant overseas deals, **Trump does not appear to care, and seems ready to test Chinese mettle on every issue.**

## 5 NO IMPACT: Nuclear proliferation is slowing in the status quo

**Van der Meer, 2011** [Sico, Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' and a PhD Candidate at the Erasmus University Rotterdam; his PhD project on nuclear proliferation dynamics is financially supported by the Dutch non-governmental organisation IKV Pax Christi. "Not that bad: Looking back on 65 years of nuclear non-proliferation efforts" *Security and Human Rights 2011 no.1*]

Since the invention and first use of nuclear weapons, predictions on the spread of these weapons have been traditionally pessimistic. Especially during the Cold War, from 1945 to 1991, the persistent pessimism among experts and policymakers is — with the knowledge of looking backwards — surprising. During the first decades of the Cold War it was generally expected that far more countries would acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal rather soon. This pessimism was not that strange, considering that nuclear weapons were generally seen as acceptable, desirable and even necessary among political and military elites in many nations during the 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>2</sup> Nuclear weapons are considered as the ultimate weapon that would deter any enemy from attacking. Moreover, nuclear weapons offer not only military power: they are also considered to increase a state's political power internationally. Having nuclear weapons grants a state — and its leadership — international prestige, and a nuclear weapon state will automatically be considered and treated as a (regional) superpower. Based on this positive attitude towards nuclear weapons, forecasts in these years were therefore easily predicting that 20 to 25 states would become nuclear weapon powers within the next few decades; countries like Sweden, West Germany and Japan are examples of countries that were often considered would soon cross the nuclear threshold, but they never did. One of the reasons for the alarming forecasts during much of the Cold War period was the failure of many estimates to distinguish between the capacity of states to develop nuclear weapons and the desire of these states to do so.<sup>3</sup> Even nowadays, however, political and academic forecasts often tend to be rather pessimistic, predicting nuclear domino effects, or chain reactions, when new nuclear weapon powers (for example, Iran) will emerge and cause other states to develop nuclear weapons too. Despite all the pessimistic forecasts, however, only nine states nowadays possess nuclear weapons. Although more states have employed nuclear weapons programmes at some point in the past 65 years, most of them have sooner or later ended their ambition to acquire these weapons. Some states even destroyed their nuclear arsenal (South Africa) or gave up inherited arsenals (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). Especially since the second half of the 1980s the number of states with nuclear weapons-related activities has become very marginal

## **1AR Extension to 2AC #1: NON-UNIQUE: Relations Bad Now**

**Extend the 2AC SYDNEY MORNING HERALD evidence. It says that Trump's phone call to Taiwan was the worst thing that's happened to relations with China in 35 years and could cause conflict by itself. Group their responses.**

1. Their New York Times evidence says China will give Trump a grace period, but it concedes that Taiwan is a key issue. After 35 years of conflict over Taiwan, there's no grace period when it comes to Taiwan.
2. *[Choose one of the two following extension cards on the next 3 pages that YOU like BEST and read if you have time.]*

### **TRUMP IS VIEWED BY CHINA AS DESTABILIZING RELATIONS**

**REUTERS, NOVEMBER 9TH, 2016** <http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-china/>

Donald **Trump's** upset election **victory** cracks open pressing strategic and economic questions in U.S.-China ties, and **has likely surprised and worried Chinese leaders, who prize stability in relations between the two powers.**

**Trump had lambasted China throughout the campaign**, drumming up headlines with his pledges to slap 45% tariffs on imported Chinese goods and label the country a currency manipulator his first day in office.

**He has also** questioned U.S. security commitments to allies and **undercut long-held bipartisan U.S. foreign policy norms, such as suggesting that Japan develop nuclear weapons**, all stances **that** if he follows through on **could upset the regional security balance in Asia.**

**That unpredictability is not an ideal election outcome for China's stability-obsessed Communist Party, especially as it seeks smooth U.S. relations at a time of daunting reform challenges at home, a slowing economy, and a leadership reshuffle** of its own **that will put a new party elite around President Xi Jinping in late 2017.**

### **Trump phone call with Taiwan is historically bad for China relations**

**THE DIPLOMAT, DECEMBER 3RD, 2016** <http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/donald-trump-just-complicated-us-taiwan-relations-big-time/>

On Friday, the Financial Times confirmed that U.S. President-elect Donald J. Trump had moved forward on **a planned phone call with President Tsai** Ing-wen of Taiwan. The call represents the first contact between a U.S. president-elect (or president, for that matter) and a Taiwanese head of state since U.S. President Jimmy Carter acknowledged the Communist Party of China government in Beijing under the "one China" policy. The call **could spark the first major foreign policy crisis for the incoming Trump administration with China, which will see the call as**

**suggestive of an epochal change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.** The government of China had not reacted to the call as of this writing.

Somewhat distressingly, the FT notes that it “is not clear if the Trump transition team intended the conversation to signal a broader change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan,” suggesting that this could simply have been borne of a misunderstanding about existing U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan within Trump’s transition team. (Earlier in November, there were reports that Trump was seeking to pursue development projects in Taiwan, imbuing the whole episode with a conflict-of-interest angle as well.)

Taiwan and China maintain diplomatic ties with a mutually exclusive set of countries, with each bilateral partner recognizing either Taipei or Beijing as the exclusive host to the government of China. The United States maintains no official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but unofficially, Washington’s relations with the island — which China sees as a rightful part of its territory — are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. Most contacts are carried out through the semi-official American Institute in Taiwan, which functions as a de facto U.S. embassy; direct high-level political contacts are a clear red line for Beijing. The ambiguity governing U.S. interaction with Taiwan has been carefully balanced since 1979 and **Trump’s one phone call represents the greatest jolt to the tightrope that previous U.S. presidents have walked.**

It’s entirely unclear how China will choose to react to Trump’s provocative phone call. Beijing is already disappointed by Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party government, given the party’s pro-independence leanings. One possibility is that the domestic reaction in Taiwan to the phone call could govern the extent to which China expresses its displeasure. The Taipei Times, reporting on the call, already suggested it could be a step toward institutionalizing channels of communication between Taipei and Washington’s top leaders.

**If Trump’s outreach is widely read in Taiwan as a signal that the United States will throw its full military might behind the island in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence, Beijing could take drastic action, including putting a freeze to high-level diplomacy with Washington or cutting off relations altogether.** The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the president-elect — not the current Obama administration — took the step of reaching out to Tsai, meaning retaliation might have to wait until Trump’s inauguration in January to avoid mixed messages.

Relations between Taiwan and China have noticeably entered a cooler period since Tsai’s inauguration. Beijing suspended cross-strait collaboration with Taipei after it was unsatisfied with Tsai’s treatment of the so-called “1992 consensus,” which had governed cross-strait relations under previous Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Within Taiwan, a surge of civic nationalism, spurred on by youth activism, led to a decisive victory for the independence-leaning DPP and a repudiation of Ma’s Nationalist Party or KMT, which enjoyed better cross-strait ties.

Despite the FT’s lack of information on the extent to which the call was planned, it is possible that Trump was egged on here by his Asia advisers. For example, Peter Navarro, a Trump adviser on Asia, penned an op-ed in the National Interest advocating for muscular U.S. backing for Taiwan following Tsai’s victory and the surge in Taiwanese nationalism.

In the op-ed Navarrao bemoans Bill Clinton's decision to renounce U.S. backing for Taiwanese independence in 1998, describing a "throw-Taiwan-under-the-bus" move. U.S. policy, delivered through carefully calculated ambiguity, has been to prevent a change in the status quo across the Taiwan Strait — that means equal opposition to Taiwan unilaterally declaring independence as well as China moving to forcibly "unite" the two. (For China's People's Liberation Army, a Taiwan strait contingency remains the primary war-fighting scenario.)

Friday's call with Tsai represents Trump's second phone call-related mishap this week after Pakistan released an unusually candid readout of the president-elect's comments this week in a chat with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. (I wrote on that for The Diplomat earlier.) Between the two incidents, we see a distressing possibility for early foreign policy crises in the Asia-Pacific in a Trump administration.

As I noted on election night, **the Taiwan Strait is one of the geopolitical Flashpoints likeliest to see a major conflagration under a Trump presidency.** Friday's phone call makes the 21st century's "first" Taiwan crisis all the more likely.

Update: The Trump campaign has posted its readout of the call between Tsai and Trump:

President-elect Trump spoke with President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan, who offered her congratulations. During the discussion, they noted the close economic, political, and security ties exist between Taiwan and the United States. President-elect Trump also congratulated President Tsai on becoming President of Taiwan earlier this year.

As Patrick Chovanec observed on Twitter, whatever the impression of the call may be from the Taiwanese side, **the mere fact that Trump called Tsai the "president of Taiwan" in an official readout will cause a conniption in China.**

# **China Nationalism Disadvantage (January 2017 Update)**

# China Nationalism Disadvantage (January 2017 Update) – AFF Answer Updates

**NO LINK and NON-UNIQUE: No risk of nationalist backlash to the PLAN – Xi has undisputed control and Trump is perceived positively by the Chinese, even after his Taiwan actions**

## **THE ECONOMIST, DECEMBER 17TH, 2016**

["Taiwan fears becoming Donald Trump's bargaining chip." *Leading news source* <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21711955-china-worries-about-president-elect-too-taiwan-fears-becoming-donald-trumps-bargaining-chip> MYY]

Mr Trump's remarks would have riled the Chinese leadership at any time. But they are particularly unwelcome at this juncture for China's leader, Xi Jinping. He is absorbed by preparations for crucial meetings due to be held late in 2017 at which sweeping reshuffles of the Politburo and other Communist Party bodies will be announced. Those trying to block his appointments would be quick to seize on any sign that he is being soft on America over such a sensitive matter as Taiwan. Should Mr Trump persist in challenging the one-China idea, the risk of escalation will be even greater than usual in the build-up to the conclaves—all the more so, perhaps, given Mr Xi's insistence that differences between China and Taiwan "cannot be passed on from generation to generation". Hawkish colleagues may say that it is time to settle the issue by force. Street protests in China against America or Taiwan would also make it more difficult for Mr Xi to compromise: he would fear becoming a target himself of Chinese nationalists' wrath. But the risk of this may be low. Since Mr Xi took over in 2012 there have been no major outbreaks of nationalist unrest, partly thanks to his tightening of social and political controls (including locking up ever more dissidents). Sun Zhe of Tsinghua University says people are unlikely to demonstrate over Taiwan "because they understand the new rules, the new emphasis on political discipline in the last few years." He says a lot of people in China still admire Mr Trump for his wealth and his unexpected political success. They think that "he wants to make a deal with China."

## **China Nationalism Disadvantage (Jan 2017 Update) – NEG BRINK**

**China's hardline nationalists are already pushing Xi about Trump – they're watching now but will come down hard against any further sign of weakness**

**NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 19<sup>TH</sup>, 2016** <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/asia/-china-donald-trump-power.html>

So far, Mr. **Xi has not reacted publicly to Mr. Trump's warnings**. The two men had a brief but cordial call after Mr. Trump won the election. Chinese leaders rarely wade openly into disputes, leaving that to junior officials. But **pressure for a tougher reaction to Mr. Trump could build in China if he keeps lobbing out warnings**, especially after he becomes president.

Experts disagreed over whether **China's seizure of the** submersible **drone was intended as a** signal to Mr. Trump, or even authorized by Mr. Xi. But Chinese decision makers probably took into account that Mr. Trump's team would read it as "a **test and a warning**," said Ni Lexiong, a naval affairs researcher at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. **"It would be impossible for China not to react to his provocations,"** Mr. Ni said by telephone. "Trump seems to want a foreign policy that keeps the other side guessing. But that way of working can easily lead to trouble."

On Monday, an editorial in **a prominent Communist Party newspaper said** that Mr. Xi's government needed to be ready for rockier relations.

"Trump hits out with a hammer to the east and a club to the west, and his real thinking is very difficult to fathom," said the editorial in the overseas edition of the paper, People's Daily, using a Chinese saying that means to speak or act without rhyme or reason. **China, it said, should "stay steady on its feet, keep a good grasp of developments, calmly respond, and that's it."**

**But even China's calls for calm have barbs and caveats** that could rile a Trump administration.

When the Chinese defense ministry said it would return the submersible drone, it also said the Chinese ship showed a "professional and responsible attitude" by seizing the device, although the drone appeared to be outside even an extremely expansive view of China's rightful reach in the South China Sea.

**Chinese hard-liners are already urging a harsher response to Mr. Trump**. On Saturday, Global Times, a newspaper often dominated by anti-American rhetoric, held a forum in Beijing where speakers urged tough retaliation if Mr. Trump moved closer to Taiwan, and praised the seizure of the underwater drone.

**"China isn't afraid of confrontation with America," Dai Xu, a former Chinese Air Force senior colonel and outspoken hawk, said** at the meeting. "Without China's cooperation, Trump will

achieve nothing. I dare say that if he opts for confrontation with China, he won't stay in office for more than four years."

Another speaker, Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, told Global Times: "**China is a dragon. America is an eagle.** Britain is a lion. **When the dragon wakes up, the others are all snacks.**"

Such tough talk does not set Chinese foreign policy, but Mr. **Xi and other leaders are sensitive to nationalist ire that they themselves have nurtured.** Mr. Xi has summed up his vision of national rejuvenation and strength as the "Chinese Dream," a theme he has promoted since taking office.